Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 47
Number 4 Millstone Lecture (Summer 2003)

Article 10

11-7-2003

Zoning Adult Businesses After Los Angeles v. Alameda Books
Mindi M. Jelsema

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mindi M. Jelsema, Zoning Adult Businesses After Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 47 St. Louis U. L.J.
(2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol47/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information,
please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ZONING ADULT BUSINESSES AFTER LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA
BOOKS

I. INTRODUCTION
As observed by the United States Supreme Court, the French author
Voltaire eloquently illuminated the right of free speech provided to citizens of
this country in one powerful statement, “I disapprove of what you say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it.”1 The ideal embodied by this
sentiment is challenged aggressively in situations where a community has a
significant interest in regulating unpopular speech.2 One example of such a
situation is City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,3 which was recently
presented to the United States Supreme Court. In this case, the Court was
asked to rule on the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance regulating the
location of adult entertainment businesses. While the decision only received
plurality support, the holding in Alameda is sound. The plurality and
concurring opinions, as will be shown, provide the appropriate rationale for
determining whether a zoning ordinance is designed to serve a substantial
government interest and is deemed to be constitutional.
It is questionable whether some types of establishments, especially those
that are adult-oriented, enjoy the First Amendment’s full protection.4
Allegedly, a lesser extent of protection applies when city governments, acting
within their zoning powers, inhibit the prosperity of these businesses by
limiting their choice of location,5 hours,6 and modes of operation.7 City

1. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(quoting S. TALLENTRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907)).
2. Z.J. Gifts D-2 L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998). The Z.J.
Gifts court recognized that “governmental limitations which limit expressive interests strike ‘[a]t
the heart of the First Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). Dealing specifically with adult entertainment, Supreme Court Justice
Stevens commented that “few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”
Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
3. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
4. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). Nude dancing can
consist of “expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though [the
Court] view[s] it as only marginally so.” Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
5. See generally Young, 427 U.S. at 52; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41 (1986).
1117
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governments are fully entitled to restrict the free use of land if the regulation is
justified by “some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”8
The rationale behind this proposition seems to be that “[t]he operation of an
establishment like [an adult book store] may have a place in our society but
like the proverbial pig, it can be regulated out of the parlor and off the lawn.”9
Thus, in order to preserve the First Amendment protections of these adult
establishments, it is important to maintain a balance between a city’s zoning
power and a specific business’ right of free speech.10
While regulations that limit speech based on its content “presumptively
violate the First Amendment,”11 cities are not held to such a strict standard
when they justify the regulation of adult establishments, not by the content of
speech, but by the secondary effects the businesses generate. As evidenced by
numerous studies,12 the damage produced by these establishments is
measurable,13 and the “law does not require a city to ignore these consequences
if it uses its zoning power in a reasonable way to ameliorate them without
suppressing speech.”14 Thus, when a city takes action and imposes a zoning
regulation, one pivotal question is whether the ordinance is designed to serve
the government’s asserted interest in combating negative secondary effects.15
When considering the evidence on this issue, certain standards must be
employed to determine whether the regulation passes constitutional muster.
First established by the Supreme Court in 1986,16 those standards were
recently reviewed in Alameda. This article will introduce Alameda in Section
II and will outline the relevant history that brought it before the United States
Supreme Court in Section III. Section IV will discuss and dissect the Supreme
6. See generally Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entertainment Establishments of Delaware,
10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
7. See generally Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. Young, 427 U.S. at 74 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
9. Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 137.
10. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002).
11. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
12. ERIC DAMIAN KELLY & CONNIE COOPER, “EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO
KNOW ABOUT REGULATING SEX BUSINESSES. . .” 57-65 (2000). A 1998 study from Denver, Colo.
concluded that adult shops lowered property values, generated crime, and decreased the quality of
life. Id. at 57. A 1986 Fort Worth, Tex. study found the adult businesses contributed “to
neighborhood decline by increasing vice-related activities, such as prostitution, obscenity,
violations, and public lewdness.” Id. at 58. A study performed in St. Paul, Minn. in 1978 found
that the “the presence of adult entertainment establishments correlate[d] statistically with poor
neighborhood condition.” Id. at 62. A 1990 Tucson, Ariz. study exemplified the unsanitary
conditions of some adult businesses—findings that may prove useful as support for regulations.
Id. at 63.
13. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
16. See id.
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Court opinions rendered in that case and will evaluate subsequent lower court
decisions. Based on prior precedent as well as the responses from lower
courts, it is apparent the plurality opinion, as well as Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion, resolved the evidentiary issue correctly.
II. CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. ALAMEDA BOOKS, INC.
Even though a balance has been reached, the boundary preventing the
government from encroaching upon a business’ right of free speech is not
clearly defined. This ambiguity is exemplified in Alameda. In 1977, the city
of Los Angeles conducted a comprehensive study to assess how concentrations
of adult businesses impacted their surrounding areas.17 The study “found a
positive correlation between concentrations of adult businesses and increases
in prostitution, robberies, assaults, and thefts.”18 It also noted “there was
‘some basis to conclude’ that property values in the study areas increased to a
lesser degree than in the control areas.”19
Responding to this study in 1978, the city enacted Los Angeles Municipal
Code § 12.70(C) which attempted to regulate the location of adult
entertainment establishments.20 After the enactment of the ordinance however,
it became evident that multiple adult enterprises were congregating in a single
building.21 To prevent this effect, in 1983, the city amended section 12.70(C)
to prohibit “the establishment or maintenance of more than one adult
entertainment business in the same building, structure or portion thereof.”22
Further, the definition of “adult entertainment business” was altered to include
and distinguish between adult arcades, bookstores, cabarets, motels, theaters,
massage parlors, and places for sexual encounter.23 According to the
ordinance, each specified enterprise would “constitute a separate adult
entertainment business even if operated in conjunction with another adult
entertainment business at the same establishment.”24 In addition, each would

17. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2000).
18. Alameda, 222 F.3d at 720.
19. Id. at n.1. With respect to property values however, the study concluded “the
concentration of adult businesses was not the primary cause” of lesser appreciation of value. Id.
20. Id. This ordinance prohibited “the establishment, substantial enlargement, or transfer of
ownership or control of an adult business establishment within 1,000 feet of another such
business or within 500 feet of any religious institution, school, or public park.” Id. (citing
L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C) (1977). The constitutionality of this first regulation has not been
challenged, and the Court assumed it was valid. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 431.
22. Id. (quoting L.A.M.C. § 12.70 (1983)).
23. Id. (citing L.A.M.C. § 12.70(B)(17)).
24. Id. (quoting L.A.M.C. § 12.70(B)(17)).
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be held individually accountable for obeying the locational restrictions outlined
therein.25
Both Alameda Books, Inc. (“Alameda”) and Highland Books, Inc.
(“Highland”) operated “retail sales and rental operations in the same
commercial space in which [their] video booths [were] located”26 and were
concededly violating section 12.70(C) of the amended city code.27 Alameda
and Highland joined together, suing “for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent enforcement of the ordinance,” which allegedly violated their First
Amendment rights.28
The district court for the Central District of California granted Alameda’s
and Highland’s motion for summary judgment and “issued a permanent
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance against [them].”29 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed because it determined that the
“city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to
demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments [was] ‘designed
to serve’ the city’s substantial interest in reducing crime.”30 The Ninth Circuit
held that because the city did not satisfy the test used to judge the validity of an
adult entertainment regulation justified by secondary effects,31 the ordinance
was accordingly invalid.32 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari33 “to clarify the standard for determining whether an ordinance
serves a substantial government interest,” and ultimately reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.34
III. PRECEDENT NECESSITATING SUPREME COURT REVIEW
To understand the underlying problem presented in Alameda, whether a
zoning ordinance is designed to serve a substantial government interest, it is
essential to review prior decisions that both give rise to the inquiry as well as
call for its resolution. Of particular importance are the United States Supreme
Court cases that codified the standards for review when dealing with an adult

25. See id.
26. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 432.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 433.
30. Id. “The Court of Appeals found that the 1977 study did not reasonably support the
inference that a concentration of adult operations within a single adult establishment produced
greater levels of criminal activity because the study focused on the effect that a concentration of
establishments—not a concentration of operations within a single establishment—had on crime
rates.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 436.
31. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
32. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 433.
33. 532 U.S. 902 (2001).
34. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 433.
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entertainment establishment’s challenge to its city’s zoning ordinance. These
cases are discussed in Section A. Additionally, the differing interpretations of
such standards among the circuit courts, analyzed in Section B, illuminate
relevant considerations that necessitated Supreme Court guidance. Finally,
Section C explores the history of Alameda.
A.

Supreme Court Foundation

As recognized by one commentator, what is now known as the “secondary
effects” doctrine originated as a footnote35 in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.36 The ordinance at issue in that case prohibited adult motion
picture theaters and book stores from being located within 1,000 feet of any
two other such establishments or within 500 feet of a residential area.37 Those
supporting the ordinance emphasized that a concentration of such businesses
tended to “attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely
affect[ed] property values, cause[d] an increase in crime, especially
prostitution, and encourage[d] residents and businesses to move elsewhere.”38
Two adult motion picture operators that were located in violation of the
ordinance brought suit.
Alleging the ordinance would prohibit some theaters from exhibiting films
protected by the First Amendment, the motion picture operators argued that the
ordinance was unconstitutional.39 A majority of the Court found the 1,000-foot
restriction imposed on the adult motion picture theaters did not “create an
impermissible restraint on protected communication” even though the theaters
were required to “satisfy a locational restriction not applicable to other
theaters.”40 It then held that apart from the dissimilar treatment of certain
theaters, as well as “the fact that the classification [was] predicated on the
content of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place
where such films may be exhibited [did] not offend the First Amendment.”41
The Court further stressed, “[r]easonable regulations of the time, place, and
manner of protected speech, where those regulations are necessary to further
significant governmental interests, [were] permitted by the First
Amendment.”42 Disappointingly though, although the Court reached a
conclusion, it divided over the appropriate rationale.
35. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 61 (1997).
36. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
37. Id. at 52. Adopted in 1972, this ordinance was, among others, an amendment to
Detroit’s “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” that had been initiated ten years earlier. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 55.
39. Id.
40. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
41. Id. at 63.
42. Id. at 63 n.18.
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The plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens focused on “the need for
absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication may
not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed
by the communicator.”43 That said, Justice Stevens was quick to point out that
“a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the
government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected
communication.”44 The remaining question therefore, was whether the line
could be “justified by the city’s interest in preserving the character of its
neighborhoods,”45 an interest that “must be accorded high respect.”46 Turning
to the facts, Justice Stevens found that through police department memoranda
and findings made by the city’s common council,47 the city had shown that the
increase in criminal activity and area deterioration was caused by
concentrations of adult movie theaters and not by those showing other types of
films.48 Thus, it was evident that it was the “secondary effect which the zoning
ordinances attempt[ed] to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.”49
Falling under such a classification, Justice Stevens concluded the zoning
ordinance was constitutional.50
Building on the principles established in Young, the Court in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,51 went a step further to develop a
constitutional test of validity. In that case, the Mayor of Renton advised the
city council to enact zoning legislation to deal with adult entertainment
establishments.52 As a result, the Planning and Development Committee “held
public hearings, reviewed the experiences of . . . other cities, and received a
report from the City Attorney’s Office advising as to developments in other

43. Id. at 67.
44. Id. at 70. The “regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to
communicate; whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another,
the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.” Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
45. Id. at 71.
46. Id. “Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems.” Id.
47. Id. at 55 n.8. “[T]he Detroit Common Council made a finding that some uses of property
are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas.” Young,
427 U.S. at 54.
48. Id. at 71 n.34.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 72-73. “Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the
place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination of whether a particular
film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content, [Justice Stevens concluded] that
the city’s interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its
classification of motion pictures.” Id. at 72.
51. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
52. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

ZONING ADULT BUSINESSES AFTER LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA BOOKS

1123

cities.”53 Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the City Council
enacted an ordinance prohibiting any adult motion picture theater “from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family
dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school.”54 The owner of
two theaters located in violation of the ordinance challenged its
constitutionality.55
In Renton, the Court outlined a three-prong test which must be satisfied in
order for a zoning ordinance of this sort to be considered constitutionally valid.
Finding authority from Justice Stevens in Young, the Court stated the first step
was to determine whether the ordinance could be analyzed as a “time, place,
and manner regulation.”56 The ordinances in Young and Renton were similar
and could both be so characterized because they restricted the possible
locations within which adult businesses could operate instead of prohibiting
them completely.57
Following close behind was the second query: whether the ordinance was
content-based or content-neutral.58 This determination was significant because
each classification applied a different standard to establish constitutionality.
For example, “regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the
basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.”59
Alternatively, content-neutral regulations are “acceptable so long as they are
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of communication.”60 In Renton, the Court deferred
to the lower court’s finding that the City Council’s “predominate concerns”
were with the secondary effects of theaters housing such adult films.61 It
53. Id. While discussions were taking place, the City Council imposed a moratorium on the
licensing of sexually explicit businesses, explaining that such businesses would severely impact
neighboring communities. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 45.
56. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 46-47.
59. Id. When a regulation “focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact
that speech has on its listeners,” the regulation is labeled content based. United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-812 (2000) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988) (emphasis in original)). Analyzing the regulation under strict scrutiny, “it must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.” Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. at 813. Thus, if there is a “less restrictive alternative [that] would serve the
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” Id. “To do otherwise would be
to restrict speech without an adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not
permit.” Id.
60. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
61. Id. In finding the Renton ordinance to be content-neutral, the Court stressed that instead
of being designed to “suppress the expression of unpopular views,” the ordinance was designed to
combat negative secondary effects associated with adult establishments. Id. at 48. “If [the city]
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concluded, “zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary
effects of [adult entertainment] businesses [were] to be reviewed under the
standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner
regulations.”62
After an ordinance is deemed to be content-neutral, the Court must still
consider Renton’s third step: whether the ordinance “is designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues
of communication.”63 In determining whether an ordinance is designed to
serve a substantial interest, courts must keep in mind that the
First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated
by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.64

The Renton Court also recognized it must show deference to the city’s choices
for combating negative externalities, stating it was not the Court’s “function to
appraise the wisdom of [the city’s] decision to require adult theaters to be
separated rather than concentrated in the same areas.”65 Thus, because the
secondary effects associated with concentrations of adult businesses are
“admittedly [a] serious problem,” the “city must be allowed a reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions.”66
Even when the regulations are connected to a substantial government
interest, the final task is to determine whether the ordinance leaves open
alternative avenues of communication for the adult entertainment business.67
Identifying alternative avenues, the Court in Renton stressed that there was no
First Amendment violation when adult businesses were placed on an equal
footing with other prospective purchasers or lessees of real estate.68 The Court
expressly stated, “the First Amendment requires only that [the city] refrain
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and
operate an adult theater within the city.”69

had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to
close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.” Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
62. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id. at 51-52.
65. Id. at 52 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original).
66. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)).
67. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
68. Id. at 54. The Court was quick to note that it had “never suggested that the First
Amendment [compelled] the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of
speech-related businesses for that matter, [would] be able to obtain sites at bargain prices.” Id.
69. Id.
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Turning to the facts before it, the Renton Court concluded that the city had
validly responded to the “admittedly serious problems” associated with adult
businesses and had not used “the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing
expression.”70 The zoning ordinance was therefore constitutional.71 Although
its ultimate decision was important, it was the three-part test set out in Renton
that cemented the guidelines for lower courts to follow.
Five years after Renton was decided, the Supreme Court issued a plurality
decision upholding a zoning ordinance that regulated nude dancing in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.72 Of significance to this discussion is Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion, in which he commented on the applicability of the Renton
test.73 Justice Souter noted that in Renton, the city “was not compelled to
justify its restrictions by studies specifically relating to the problems that
would be caused by adult theaters in that city.”74 As a result, a city could rely
on the experiences of other cities demonstrating a correlation between
secondary effects and one adult theater.75 Justice Souter then found
similarities between the regulated activities in Barnes with those in Renton and
commented that it was “no leap to say that live nude dancing . . . [was] likely
to produce the same pernicious secondary effects as [] adult films. . . .”76
Therefore, in light of Renton,77 the State “could reasonably conclude that
forbidding nude entertainment” furthered its interests in preventing
prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes.78
Shortly before Alameda reached the Supreme Court, another nude dancing
case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,79 helped shed light on Renton’s standards.
70. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell J., concurring)).
71. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55. The city had preserved the quality of life in its communities
while “satisfying the dictates of the First Amendment.” Id.
72. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (applying the slightly different intermediate
scrutiny test from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The O’Brien test includes four
factors: 1) “whether the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
government to enact;” 2) “whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial government
interest;” 3) “that the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;” and
4) “that the restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government
interest.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296, 301 (2000) (plurality opinion).
73. The second prong of the O’Brien test asks “whether the regulation furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest,” which is sufficiently similar to Renton’s prong requiring
that the ordinance be designed to serve a substantial government interest. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at
583 (Souter, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 583-84.
75. Id. at 584.
76. Id.
77. Id. Renton recognized that “legislation seeking to combat the secondary effects of adult
entertainment need not await localized proof of [secondary] effects.” Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584.
78. Id. A state is not required to “affirmatively [] undertake to litigate this issue repeatedly
in every case.” Id. at 584-85 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
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Unfortunately however, the decision only received plurality support. Deciding
whether the challenged regulation furthered a substantial government
interest,80 Justice O’Connor noted that with regulations that “strike [close] to
the core of First Amendment values,” a “local government’s reasonable belief
that the experience of other jurisdictions [was] relevant to the problem it [was]
addressing” was sufficient.81 The record revealed however, that the city of
Erie did more than simply rely on the findings of other cities; it also relied on
its own to justify its regulation.82 The record also demonstrated the adult
business “had ample opportunity to contest the council’s findings about
secondary effects,” but it never challenged those findings or cast any specific
doubt on their validity.83 Consequently, the plurality concluded that “[i]n the
absence of any reason to doubt it, the city’s expert judgment should be
credited.”84
B.

Conflicting Interpretations by the Circuit Courts

The test outlined in Renton appeared to be straightforward in judging
whether a city intruded upon an adult business’ First Amendment rights. But
when applied in different scenarios, the standard grew susceptible to
conflicting interpretations and, as one commentator pointed out, has been
One prevalent dispute among the circuits
inconsistently employed.85
concerned the third part of Renton’s test: the extent of evidence considered
sufficient to justify reliance by a city and support a reasonable belief that the
ordinance targeted secondary effects. The viewpoints held by the circuits on
this issue tended to be similar, with one exception. The Ninth Circuit, which
decided Alameda, proved to be the divergent Circuit. As will be shown, given
the state of disagreement between the circuits, it was critical for the Supreme
Court to resolve this issue in a concrete fashion.
The challenged bill in Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment
Establishments of Delaware,86 a Third Circuit case, limited the hours during

80. As did the Court in Barnes, the Court in Pap’s A.M. used the O’Brien test. See Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-301.
81. Id. at 297.
82. Id. In fact, Erie’s City Council found on various occasions spanning over one hundred
years that “certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit . . . promote
violence, public intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.” Id.
83. Id. at 298. The only complaint raised was a simple assertion that evidentiary proof was
lacking. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 298.
84. Id. at 297.
85. David Wolfson, Case Note: City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 4 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 191, 197 (2002).
86. 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
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which adult entertainment businesses could operate.87 The bill was challenged
by respondents alleging that, before enactment, there was insufficient evidence
of the secondary effects of adult businesses to support the regulation.88 The
court in Mitchell cited Renton to support its position that the omission of such
evidence was not determinative on the regulation’s invalidity. It noted, “a city
or state may rely heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, other
cities and states, as well as on court opinions from other jurisdictions.”89 The
Mitchell court stressed however, that the city must rely on such evidence to
justify the regulations. 90 Taking into account the findings from other cities as
well as the support garnered before passage of the bill, it concluded the city
had a substantial government interest in regulating the hours of adult
businesses.91
The court in Mitchell then recognized that even after determining the
existence of a substantial government interest, it still had to address whether
the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.92 Interpreting
Renton, the court stated this requirement left “a legislative body free to classify
and draw lines, provided it [did] not wholly or practically prevent access to the
expressive material whose sale and distribution the ordinance or statute
incidentally regulate[d].”93 Under such a perspective, instead of proving a
particular adult business must be restricted to prevent undesirable secondary
effects, the city needed only to “show that adult entertainment establishments
as a class cause the unwanted secondary effects the statute regulates.”94 Under
such a definition, the restrictions in this case met the standards of Renton.

87. Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 127. The establishment offered adult film and “video presentations
for viewing from within completely enclosed booths. It also provided enclosed booths for
viewing live entertainment.” Id. at 127-28.
88. Id. at 133. There was no sworn testimony supporting its amendments, no public hearings
had been conducted, nor had the city conducted an official study to determine whether the
operating hours of an establishment affected the welfare of surrounding neighborhoods. Id. This
is not to say the bill was passed for no reason. “As pre-enactment evidence, the Senate had before
it a synopsis of the [b]ill and a statement by its chief sponsor.” Id. at 134. The district court
deemed this to be sufficient support to satisfy the test outlined in Renton. Mitchell, 10 F.3d at
134.
89. Id. at 133.
90. Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 137.
92. Id. “Whether the asserted government interest is proper and adequately supported is
usually analyzed in terms of whether the enactment is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest[.]”
Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 133.
93. Id. at 138. The Mitchell court understood Renton to mean that a state legislature did “not
need to survey every adult book store in the state to determine the effect the statute or regulation
[would] have on each.” Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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According to the Eighth Circuit in ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of
Rochester,95 it was obvious that regulations that are “reasonably designed to
curb unwanted secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses serve a
substantial governmental interest.”96 In this case, when enacting its regulation
restricting the location of adult businesses, the city relied upon studies
conducted by other cities.97 The ILQ court recognized that this practice was
clearly allowed by Renton.98 But, respondents argued that the city should be
“constitutionally required to disregard these studies” because they “did not
specifically address businesses similar to [those owned by ILQ] . . . adult
bookstores ‘that offer both sexually explicit and non-sexually explicit material
and allow only off-premises consumption of those materials.’”99 The ILQ
court responded that such a view was “simply not the law.”100 It reiterated that
a “city may rely upon studies or evidence generated by other cities ‘so long as
[that] evidence [was] reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresse[d].’”101 Thus, the court in ILQ did not require the city to prove
that specific adult establishments would likely have the exact same adverse
effects on their surroundings as did the adult businesses studied in other
cities.102
The challenged ordinance before the Tenth Circuit in Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C.
v. City of Aurora,103 was very similar to the locational zoning regulation at
issue in ILQ.104 The adult establishment challenging the ordinance did not
provide any on-site adult entertainment such as nude dancing or peep shows,
but instead only sold and rented material to customers for off-premises
viewing.105 The court in Z.J. Gifts overcame a quick obstacle after stating this
ordinance could be analyzed under either the Renton or O’Brien standards,106
because there was little difference between them.107

95. 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 1994).
96. ILQ Inv., Inc., 25 F.3d at 1416.
97. Id. at 1416-1417.
98. Id. at 1416.
99. Id. at 1417-1418. The studies focused on the secondary effects of adult businesses
generally. Id.
100. ILQ Inv., Inc., 25 F.3d at 1418.
101. Id. at 1416 (first alteration in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)).
102. Id. at 1418.
103. 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1998).
104. Specifically, the Z.J. Gifts’ ordinance “required sexually oriented businesses to locate in
industrially-zoned areas, and prohibited them from locating within 1500 feet of churches, schools,
residential districts or dwellings, public parks, and other sexually oriented businesses.” Z.J. Gifts,
136 F.3d at 685.
105. Id. at 685.
106. See id. at 688.
107. Id. at 688.
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Turning to the facts, the Z.J. Gifts court noted that the city had enacted its
ordinance after deliberating, holding public hearings, and reviewing “a
thorough legislative record.”108 The adult business argued that this evidence
failed to demonstrate “that the recited harms [were] real, not merely
conjectural . . .”109 The court disagreed and stressed a city “need not wait for
sexually oriented businesses to locate within its boundaries, depress property
values, increase crime, and spread sexually transmitted diseases before it
regulates those businesses. . . . In other words, the city may control a
perceived risk through regulation.”110 The court emphasized that “Renton’s
constitutional framework [granted] the city broad discretion to choose the
means and scope of its regulation of sexually oriented businesses.”111
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to apply the Renton test to a zoning
ordinance challenge in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County.112 The ordinance
in that case prohibited location of adult-oriented businesses “within 1000 feet
of any residential land use; place of worship; funeral home; school, park or
playground; or ‘any other recreational facility or other area where large
numbers of minors regularly travel or congregate.’”113 Although it did not find
fault with the county’s “substantial interest in preventing the deleterious
secondary effects often associated with adult theaters,”114 for the ordinance to
be valid, the court required a “logical relationship between the evil feared and
the method selected to combat it.”115 This meant that, in enacting certain
restrictions against adult businesses, the city had to show that “it relied upon
evidence permitting the reasonable inference that, absent such limitations, the
adult theaters would have harmful secondary effects.”116 According to the
Tollis court, the county failed to present evidence that “a single showing of an
adult movie would have any harmful secondary effects on the community.”117
Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinance failed to satisfy the third
prong of Renton’s test,118 and the injunction against enforcing the ordinance
was proper.119

108. Id. at 685.
109. Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 688 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 664 (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 689.
112. 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987).
113. Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1331.
114. Id. at 1332.
115. Id. at 1332-33.
116. Id. at 1333.
117. Id.
118. Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1332.
119. Id. at 1333.
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Another Ninth Circuit case, Colacurcio v. City of Kent,120 was decided
along the same lines as Tollis. After examining issues related to adult
entertainment, the city’s planning department published a study concerning the
effects of adult entertainment on surrounding communities.121 Soon afterward,
the city enacted an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, performers in
adult establishments from dancing within ten feet of patrons.122
The respondent contended there were less burdensome alternatives than the
ten-foot requirement, so the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve the
city’s interests.123 The court disagreed and specified that the alleged
alternatives, a one-foot distance requirement and a “no-touch” rule, were not
reasonable “as they would not serve the city’s purposes of controlling drug
transactions and prostitution.”124 The Colacurcio court held that the adult
business “failed to present evidence showing that a ten-foot rule burden[ed]
substantially more expression than necessary to achieve its purpose.”125
Accordingly, the ordinance was considered to be narrowly tailored to achieve
the city’s objective in combating secondary effects.126
C. Alameda Before the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,127 zeroed
in on the discreet issue of whether a regulation is “designed to serve” a
government’s substantial interest in reducing crime, which it defined to be
Colacurcio’s second step.128 The court first decided that the evidence Los
Angeles had relied upon to justify its amendments was insufficient to show
that the regulation was designed to serve the city’s interest in reducing the

120. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
121. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 548. The study also included a “discussion of various regulatory
alternatives.” Id.
122. Id. at 549. After reviewing the city’s own study as well as affidavits and statements
from police officers and vice detectives, the court found the ordinance was content neutral and
proceeded to the narrow tailoring requirement. Id. at 553.
123. Id. This case was decided using the O’Brien standards. Id. at 551.
124. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554. The proposed alternatives would “fail to provide sufficient
line-of-vision for law enforcement personnel” and would still allow “verbal communication
between dancers and patrons, thereby failing to curtail propositions for drugs or sex.” Id.
125. Id. at 554.
126. Id.
127. 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 723-24. The test outlined in Colacurcio allowed a city to “impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions [were]: (1)
content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest; and (3) [left]
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at
551 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The Ninth Circuit did
specify that there was “no substantive difference” between the standard tests in Tollis and
Colacurcio. Alameda, 222 F.3d at 722-23.
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secondary effects generated by adult businesses.129 The study did not “analyze
an individual bookstore/arcade combination as a concentration of adult
businesses[,]” and therefore “did not identify any harmful secondary effects
resulting from [such establishments] as individual business units.”130 Thus, it
was “unreasonable for the [c]ity to infer that absent its regulations, a
bookstore/arcade combination would have harmful secondary effects.”131 The
Ninth Circuit also noted that although a city may rely on foreign studies, it was
still obligated to demonstrate that its own study is reasonably believed to be
relevant to the addressed problem.132
These circuit court cases exhibit the subtle problem encountered when
interpreting the test outlined in Renton. The Ninth Circuit seemed clearly at
odds with the other circuits in imposing a higher burden on the government to
prove a connection between its regulation of adult establishments and its
substantial interest in combating secondary effects. Given this disagreement, it
was important for the Supreme Court to rule on the issue and define the
appropriate evidentiary burden. Thus by taking Alameda, the United States
Supreme Court agreed to analyze the disagreement and “clarify the standard
for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest
under Renton.”133
IV. SUPREME COURT’S FRACTURED RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
CONFUSION
Following Renton, courts used its three-part test as a safeguard to ensure
that government zoning ordinances regulating adult businesses did not infringe
on the First Amendment rights of those businesses. As shown through the
circuit court opinions, however, there were conflicting interpretations of
Renton’s standards. The Supreme Court responded in an attempt to dispel the
confusion, but did so in a fractured decision. Section A discusses the opinions
given in Alameda, penned by Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Souter, respectively. Section B analyzes these opinions and determines that
the most fitting rationale would be a combination of the opinions written by
Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy. Section C looks at lower court
decisions rendered after Alameda to discover how the circuit courts are
responding to the Supreme Court decision.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002).
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Discussion of Zoning Ordinance Rationales
1.

Justice O’Connor’s Plurality Opinion Deferred to the City’s
Justification.

The plurality opinion in Alameda was written by Justice O’Connor and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia.134
Recognizing the consequences a clear decision in this case would impose,
Justice O’Connor began by noting the Court must carefully balance competing
interests.135 It must “exercise independent judgment when First Amendment
rights are implicated,” but also acknowledge that a particular city “is in a better
position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems.”136
Applying the Renton standard in Alameda, Justice O’Connor established
the point at which evidence supporting a zoning ordinance must be introduced
in order to satisfy Renton’s third prong.137 “[T]he inquiry into whether [the
ordinance was] ‘designed to serve a substantial government interest and [did]
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication’” began with
verification that the ‘predominate concerns’ behind the ordinance were the
secondary effects of speech.138 The analysis continued with the plurality
asking “whether the municipality [could] demonstrate a connection between
the speech regulated by the ordinance and the secondary effects that motivated
the adoption of the ordinance.”139 For the plurality in Alameda, evidence
would only be required to satisfy the latter inquiry.140 The extent of evidence
sufficient to establish a correlation was the next question to resolve.
To demonstrate a connection between speech and a government interest,
Justice O’Connor followed Renton and asserted that the city may rely on any
evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” to show a correlation.141
134. Although he thought the plurality correctly applied Renton’s test in the Alameda case,
Justice Scalia also wrote separately. Drawing on his earlier opinions in Pap’s A.M. and FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), Justice Scalia reasserted his view that the “secondary
effects” rationale in the regulation of pornographic speech was completely unnecessary. Id. at
443 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment); FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 256-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). He held strongly to the notion that the “Constitution does not prevent those
communities that wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the business of
pandering sex.” Alameda, 535 at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 440.
136. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666, 665-66
(1978)).
137. Id. at 440.
138. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
139. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 441.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 438 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)).
In Renton, the Court held that a city, in enacting an adult business zoning ordinance, was allowed
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She was also quick to point out that this did not mean that “a municipality
[could] get away with shoddy data or reasoning,” but only that the evidence
must “fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.”142 Justice
O’Connor then proposed a useful balancing test:
If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on [the secondary effects] rationale, either
by demonstrating that the municipality’s evidence does not support its
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual
findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs
succeed in casting doubt on a municipality’s rationale in either manner, the
burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence
renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.143

Looking to the facts of the case, Justice O’Connor identified the central
piece of evidence at issue in Alameda as the city’s 1977 study, which included
a report on city crime patterns provided by the Los Angeles Police
Department.144 The Court of Appeals had faulted the 1977 study for focusing
on “the effect that a concentration of establishments—not a concentration of
operations within a single establishment—had on crime rates.”145 The
Alameda plurality responded that the Ninth Circuit “misunderstood the
implications of the 1977 study.”146 Justice O’Connor found that it was both
consistent with the 1977 study and reasonable for Los Angeles “to suppose that
a concentration of adult establishments [was] correlated with high crime rates
because a concentration of operations in one locale draws, for example, a
greater concentration of adult consumers to the neighborhood, and a high
density of such consumers either attracts or generates criminal activity.”147
The plurality in Alameda then concluded that it was “rational for the city to
infer that reducing the concentration of adult operations in a neighborhood,
whether within separate establishments or in one large establishment, [would]
reduce crime rates.”148
to rely on experiences of other cities as well as findings of other courts. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.
As long as the evidence relied upon is “reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses,” the method chosen by the city to further its interests would receive deference. Id.
at 51-52. “The city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems.” Id. at 52 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)).
142. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438.
143. Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 435.
145. Id. at 436. “The Court of Appeals pointed out that the study treated combination adult
bookstore/arcades as single establishments and did not study the effect of any separate-standing
adult bookstore or arcade.” Id.
146. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 436.
147. Id. The underlying assumption is that multiple adult businesses in one establishment
draws the same traffic as multiple establishments in close proximity to each other. Therefore, it is
very similar to mini-malls and department stores which attract crowds of consumers. Id.
148. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1134

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1117

Addressing the type of evidence necessary for Los Angeles to show that its
ordinance successfully decreased secondary effects, Justice O’Connor
specified that empirical evidence was not required.149 The Court had “never
required that municipalities make such a showing, certainly not without actual
and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the contrary.”150 This was
especially true in this case where neither establishment “provide[d] any reason
to question the city’s theory.”151
While the city certainly bears the burden of providing evidence that supports a
link between concentrations of adult operations and asserted secondary effects,
it does not bear the burden of providing evidence that rules out every theory
for the link between concentrations of adult establishments that is inconsistent
with its own.152

Imposing an empirical evidence requirement “would go too far in undermining
[the] settled position that municipalities must be given a ‘reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions’ to address the secondary effects of
protected speech.”153 Thus, for Justice O’Connor, instead of requiring
empirical evidence to prove a correlation between the regulated speech and
secondary effects, only a reasonable belief of such a connection was
necessary.154 The Alameda plurality concluded that the 1977 study conducted
by Los Angeles was sufficient to support a reasonable belief by the city that
the regulation would further its interest in combating negative secondary
effects, and accordingly, it met Renton’s third prong.
2.

Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Considered the Effect on Speech.

Justice Kennedy’s agreement with the plurality that Los Angeles could
reasonably rely on its 1977 study to justify regulation of the adult
establishments in question secured a majority decision in this case. His
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 437. “In particular, they do not offer a competing theory, let alone data, that
explains why the elevated crime rates in neighborhoods with a concentration of adult
establishments can be attributed entirely to the presence of permanent walls between, and
separate entrances to, each individual adult operation.” Id.
152. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 437.
153. Id. at 439 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
154. Id. at 430, 442. Justice O’Connor gave an example of a city considering an innovative
solution, such as the Los Angeles ordinance in this case, which regulated multiple-use adult
establishments. Id. at 430-40. The city might “not have data that could demonstrate the efficacy
of its proposal because the solution would, by definition, not have been implemented previously.”
Id. Allegedly, there were no adult video arcades that operated independently of adult bookstores.
Alameda, 535 U.S. at 440. Thus, there would be no treatment group with which to compare a
control group of adult establishments. Id. If the ordinance would be struck down accordingly for
lack of such an empirical comparison, the city would be without the “means to address the
secondary effects with which it is concerned.” Id. at 440.
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separate opinion, however, provided a rationale divergent from that of Justice
O’Connor. For Justice Kennedy, the question presented in this case was
“whether the ordinance at issue [was] invalid ‘because the city did not study
the negative effects of such combinations of adult businesses, but rather relied
on judicially approved statutory precedent from other jurisdictions.’”155 He
answered this question by splitting it into two separate inquiries: what
proposition must be advanced to sustain a secondary-effects ordinance and
what is the extent of evidence required to support the proposition?156
In the answer to the first of his two questions, Justice Kennedy began by
showing respect to city governments that know that “high concentrations of
adult businesses can damage the value and the integrity of a neighborhood.
The damage is measurable; it is all too real.”157 Accordingly, the “law [did]
not require a city to ignore these consequences if it uses its zoning power in a
reasonable way to ameliorate them without suppressing speech.”158 With these
ideas in mind, Justice Kennedy asserted that the “rationale of the ordinance
must be that it will suppress secondary effects—and not by suppressing
speech.”159 Therefore, the premise behind the ordinance must be that the
ordinance “will cause two businesses to split rather than one to close, that the
quantity of speech will be substantially undiminished, and that total secondary
effects will be significantly reduced.”160
The remaining question for Justice Kennedy was whether there was
sufficient evidence in this case to support such a rationale. Because the Los
Angeles City Council knew the streets of Los Angeles better than the Court,
the City Council was “entitled to rely on that knowledge; and if its inferences
appear[ed] reasonable, [the Court] should not say there [was] no basis for its
conclusion.”161 Justice Kennedy noted that after finding “a correlation
between the concentration of adult establishments and crime” as a result of its
own study, the city of Los Angeles “sought to disperse these businesses.”162
The Court would be allowed to posit that a “dispersal ordinance would cause a

155. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Pet. for Cert. i ).
156. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “It is no trick to reduce secondary effects by
reducing speech or its audience; but a city may not attack secondary effects indirectly by
attacking speech.” Id. at 450.
160. Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “If two adult businesses are under the same roof,
an ordinance requiring them to separate will have one of two results: One business will either
move elsewhere or close. The city’s premise cannot be the latter.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 450-51.
161. Id. at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “Two or more adult businesses in close proximity
seem[ed] to attract a critical mass of unsavory characters and the crime rate may increase as a
result.” Id.
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great reduction in secondary effects at very small cost to speech.”163 As a
result, the remaining step to justify the ordinance was to permit the city to
“infer—from its study and from its own experience—that two adult businesses
under the same roof [were] no better than two next door.”164 Thus, Justice
Kennedy agreed with the plurality in concluding that the Los Angeles
regulation was reasonably likely to reduce negative secondary effects
associated with adult establishments.165
3.

Justice Souter’s Dissent Argued that the Evidence was Insufficient.

Justice Souter, along with Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer, concluded that Los Angeles had failed to demonstrate a sufficient
connection between its amended zoning ordinance and its interest in crime
control.166
Justice Souter focused on the empirical nature of the evidence necessary to
support a secondary effects zoning ordinance.167 He began by attacking the
city’s 1977 study itself, stating it was unsuccessful in confirming an
“association between higher crime rates and any isolated adult
establishments.”168 According to Justice Souter, the city reviewed its study
and simply assumed “a bookstore selling videos and providing viewing booths
produce[d] secondary effects of crime, and more crime than would result from
having a single store without booths in one part of town and a video arcade in
another.”169 This assumption was faulty because the city offered no evidence
to support “even the simple proposition that an otherwise lawfully located
adult bookstore combined with video booths [would] produce any criminal
163. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). “We may posit that two adult stores next door to each
other attract 100 patrons per day. The two businesses split apart might attract 49 patrons each.
(Two patrons, perhaps, will be discouraged by the inconvenience of the separation—a relatively
small cost to speech.)” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 452. Justice Kennedy continued, stating that
“[d]epending on the economics of vice, 100 potential customers/victims might attract a coterie of
thieves, prostitutes, and other ne’er-do-wells; yet 49 might attract none at all.” Id. If this was the
case, “a dispersal ordinance would cause a great reduction in secondary effects at very small cost
to speech.” Id.
164. Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “The city could reach the reasonable conclusion
that knocking down the wall between two adult businesses does not ameliorate any undesirable
secondary effects of their proximity to one another.” Id.
165. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 458 (Souter, J., dissenting). “In examining claims that there are causal
relationships between adult businesses and an increase in secondary effects . . . , and between
zoning and the mitigation of the effects, stress needs to be placed on the empirical character of the
demonstration available.” Id. “The weaker the demonstration of facts distinct from disapproval
of the ‘adult’ viewpoint, the greater the likelihood that nothing more than condemnation of the
viewpoint drives the regulation.” Id.
168. Alameda, 535 U.S. (Souter J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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effects.”170 Furthermore, the only evidence produced by the city was the study,
which could not support the proposition because it drew “no general
conclusion that individual stores spread apart from other adult
establishments . . . [were] associated with any degree of criminal activity above
the general norm.”171 Based on the study, the proper conclusion for Justice
Souter was that splitting up the freestanding adult stores would “have no
consequence for secondary effects whatever.”172
Justice Souter bolstered his position by refuting the applicability of the
studies used in Renton and Young. He pointed to a ‘key distinction’ between
the Los Angeles breakup requirement and the zoning ordinances at issue in the
prior cases. This difference was that “the zoning approved in those two cases
had no effect on the way the owners of the stores carried on their adult
businesses beyond controlling location.”173 Los Angeles, on the other hand,
“no longer accept[ed] businesses as their owners choose to conduct them
within their own four walls, but [barred] a video arcade in a bookstore, a
combination shown by the record to be commercially natural, if not
universal.”174 Thus, Justice Souter concluded the ordinance lacked “any
demonstrable connection to the interest in crime control” and imposed a
heavier burden than that condoned by the Court in either Renton or Young.175
B.

Analysis
1.

Summary Judgment Requires Inferences Drawn in the City’s Favor

The distinct aspects of Alameda, particularly its disposition as a summary
judgment motion, solidify its holding. When considering a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows any genuine issue of
material fact.176 Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy appropriately
concluded that because this case was only at the summary judgment stage, Los

170. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). The city has not “called the Court’s attention to any
other empirical study, or even anecdotal police evidence, that supports the city’s assumption.” Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting). The subsequent inference therefore, must be that “if the Los Angeles
study sheds any light whatever on the city’s position, it is the light of skepticism, for [the Court]
may fairly suspect that the study said nothing about the secondary effects of freestanding stores
because no effects were observed.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting). Furthermore, “no heavier burden than the location
limit was approved by this Court.” Id.
174. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
175. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
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Angeles’ zoning regulation on adult businesses should not be struck down.177
Justice Souter, for the dissent, nonetheless disagreed, stating that Los Angeles
had failed to meet its evidentiary burden.178 The reasoning behind these
conclusions will be discussed infra.
2.

Deference to the City Makes the Presumption of Pretext
Inappropriate.

Substantial deference should be paid to the city of Los Angeles not only
because it opposed the summary judgment motion brought by the adult
businesses, but also because it was attempting to remedy a serious situation on
its city streets.179 As noted in Young and adopted by the Court in Renton, a
city’s “interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that
must be accorded high respect.”180 Both the plurality of Alameda and Justice
Kennedy agreed that a city “is in a better position than the Judiciary to gather
and evaluate data on local problems.”181 Los Angeles conducted its own study
in 1977 to assess how adult establishments impacted their surrounding
neighborhoods and found a correlation between concentrations of adult
businesses and an increase in crime.182 Relying on this study, Los Angeles
amended its zoning ordinance to prevent the congregation of adult businesses
in a single building.183 This amendment to its zoning ordinance was a clear
attempt by the city to preserve the quality of Los Angeles neighborhoods.
Under Renton, the city’s choice should be respected.184
While deferring to a particular city’s judgment on resolving local
problems, the plurality also noted that when First Amendment rights are at

177. Justice O’Connor, for the plurality, concluded that “the city, at this stage of the litigation,
ha[d] complied with the evidentiary requirement in Renton.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439. In
Justice Kennedy’s view, Los Angeles should be allowed to impose regulations on adult
businesses under its zoning authority, at least to the extent that it not be foreclosed by summary
judgment. Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 466 n. 9 (Souter, J., dissenting). “The plurality seems to ask us to shut our eyes to
the city’s failings by emphasizing that this case is merely at the stage of summary judgment, but
ignores the fact that at this summary judgment stage the city has made it plain that it relies on no
evidence beyond the 1977 study, which provides no support for the city’s action.” Id.
179. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion).
180. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (quoting Young, 427
U.S. at 71).
181. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 440 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy expressly stated that the
“Los Angeles City Council [knew] the streets of Los Angeles better than [the Court did.]” Id. at
451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further, when the inferences drawn by the city appear to be
reasonable, the Court should not say the conclusion is baseless. Id. at 452.
182. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2000).
183. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 431.
184. Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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issue, it must still exercise independent judgment.185 The failure to follow
through on this second step and “address how speech will fare under the city’s
ordinance” was, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the plurality’s downfall.186
Turning to zoning ordinances in general, Justice Kennedy asserted that they
“have a prima facie legitimate purpose: to limit the negative externalities of
land use.”187
The dissent in Alameda was primarily worried about the use of secondary
effects as a pretext for suppressing speech through zoning ordinances.188 As
Justice Kennedy eloquently put it however, “the ordinance may be a covert
attack on speech, but [the Court] should not presume it to be so.” Justice
Kennedy’s position is supported by Young and Renton.
In Young, the plurality concluded that the zoning ordinance restricting the
location of adult movie theaters in an attempt to prevent negative secondary
effects was constitutional.189 The plurality expressly noted that what
ultimately was at stake was “nothing more than a limitation on the place where
adult films may be exhibited.”190 Justice Powell, who concurred in Young,
continued along the same line, stating that if the city “had been concerned with
restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close
them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to
location.”191 Thus, the plurality and concurring opinions in Young, agreed that
the zoning ordinance, which restricted available locations for adult businesses
to operate, should not be presumed to have illicit motives.
The Court in Renton also addressed the issue of pretext and specifically
stated, “it is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not
strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
legislative motive.”192 The Court’s finding that the city’s predominate intent in

185. Id. at 440. Thus, the “deference to the evidence presented by the city of Los Angeles is
the product of a careful balance between competing interests.” Id.
186. Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While “the material inside adult bookstores and
movie theaters is speech, the consequent sordidness outside is not. The challenge is to correct the
latter while leaving the former, as far as possible, untouched.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 445
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 458 (Souter, J., dissenting). “The weaker the demonstration of facts distinct from
disapproval of the ‘adult’ viewpoint, the greater the likelihood that nothing more than
condemnation of the viewpoint drives the regulation.” Id.
189. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976).
190. Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73. The plurality went on to comment that the “situation would
be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech.” Id. at 73 n.35.
191. Id. at 82 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
192. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting United States
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). “The decisions of this [C]ourt from the beginning lend no
support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power
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regulating adult businesses was to control secondary effects was “more than
adequate to establish that the city’s pursuit of its zoning interests here [were]
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”193 Therefore, even if the
legislature had a hidden agenda, Renton showed that the Court would not
automatically strike down the statute on such a basis.
Coupling this idea of lack of pretext with that of deference to the
municipalities leads to the conclusion that Justice Kennedy was correct in
stating the secondary effects rationale of a city’s zoning ordinance should not
be presumed to be an attempt to suppress speech. The plurality in Young and
the Court in Renton were both faced with locational zoning ordinances
intended to alleviate the negative secondary effects associated with adult
businesses in their respective cities. Both gave substantial deference to the
cities and did not give credit to the argument that the secondary effects
rationale was simply a pretext for suppression of speech. Because the
ordinance in Alameda was closely related to the time, place, manner
restrictions at issue in Young and Renton, it was not, as believed to be by the
dissent, an attempt to suppress free speech or regulate how adult establishment
owners should run their businesses.
3.

The Evidentiary Burden to be Overcome by the City is Slight.

When a city asserts a secondary effects rationale for its zoning ordinance,
the Court should give deference to the city’s justification. But according to
Justice Kennedy, it should also assess the extent of intrusion the zoning
regulation would have on the adult entertainment business.194 Justice
Kennedy’s argument gains support from one commentator who asserted,
“where the limitations on speech under [zoning] regulations are considered
merely incidental to the necessary regulation of the target conduct, they pass
constitutional muster.”195 Similarly, the Court in United States v. O’Brien
noted that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment

on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)). The Court
further noted that inquiring into the purposes or motives behind the enactment of certain statutes
was a “hazardous matter.” Id. “What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is
not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for
[the Court] to eschew guesswork.” Id.
193. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
194. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 450 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
195. Jerrold J. Kippen, Sexually Explicit Speech, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 799, 800 (2001).
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freedoms.”196 The appropriate time to address the limitations upon speech
caused by a zoning ordinance, as determined under the plurality’s balancing
test, is after the adult business succeeds in casting doubt on the validity of the
city’s justification. The validity of this test is the next issue to resolve.
The so-called balancing test used by the Alameda plurality, to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to show a zoning regulation was
designed to serve a significant government interest, was hinted at in Pap’s
A.M.197 The plurality there first noted that the city council members were the
ones likely to have had firsthand knowledge “of what took place at and around
nude dancing establishments in Erie, and [could] make particularized, expert
judgments about the resulting harmful secondary effects.”198 It then continued
by stating that the establishment “had ample opportunity to contest the
council’s findings about secondary effects,” but had “never challenged that city
council’s findings or cast any specific doubt on the validity of those
findings.”199 The plurality of Pap’s A.M. then concluded that in “the absence
of any reason to doubt it, the city’s expert judgment should be credited.”200
Guided by the plurality in Pap’s A.M., Alameda’s plurality was right to
conclude that Los Angeles’ zoning ordinance was sufficiently justified by
secondary effects. The primary downfall for the adult businesses in Alameda
was their lack of proof, which called the secondary effects rationale into
question.201 Although they had the opportunity to show that the rationale was
faulty, they did not cast any doubt on the city’s findings but simply complained

196. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. Furthermore, the Court will not “foreclose consideration of
First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an ‘incidental’ restriction upon
expression . . . has the effect of entirely preventing a ‘speaker’ from reaching a significant
audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.” Id. at 388-89 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
197. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 297-98. Following up on this principle, the Court has, on another occasion, noted
that prior case law did not “require that empirical data come to [the Court] accompanied by a
surfeit of background information.” Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995).
To the contrary, litigants have been permitted “to justify speech restrictions by reference to
studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether.” Id. at 628 (citing Renton, 475
U.S. at 50-51; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)). Litigants were also
allowed to justify regulations by “simple common sense” in some circumstances. Id. (citing
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)). Even when applying the higher standard of strict
scrutiny, the litigant was allowed “to justify restriction based solely on history, consensus, and
‘simple common sense.’” Id.
199. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 298.
200. Id. After all, the ordinance was content neutral, and the “government should have
sufficient leeway to justify such a law based on secondary effects.” Id.
201. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (plurality
opinion). The plurality concluded the city had complied with its evidentiary requirements, and
the adult businesses merely supported their summary judgment motion with complaints the city’s
study failed to prove the secondary effects justification was correct. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439.
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the study was deficient. In effect, the adult businesses asked the city to
produce additional evidence while they failed to reciprocate by providing any
reason to question the rationale. As aptly displayed in Pap’s A.M., because
there was no reason to doubt the city’s justification for its ordinance, Los
Angeles’ choice to regulate adult businesses should be respected.
4.

Cities Need Not Conduct Business Specific Studies.

The dissent in Alameda stressed that the city’s study, which allegedly
supported the city’s zoning ordinance, did not in fact, provide such support.202
The city’s primary error was that it failed to show a connection between
isolated adult establishments and the negative secondary effects they allegedly
produced.203 The plurality in Alameda responded to the dissent’s contention,
stating that Justice Souter “ask[ed] the city to demonstrate, not merely by
appeal to common sense, but also with empirical data, that its ordinance will
successfully lower crime.”204 The plurality in Pap’s A.M. did not require such
a substantial showing.
In Pap’s A.M., the city relied on a study that dealt with different subject
matter than did the ordinance before it.205 The plurality in Pap’s A.M. noted
that nude dancing was “of the same character as the adult entertainment at
issue in Renton [and] Young.”206 Thus, “it was reasonable for Erie to conclude
that such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects.”207
Similarly, the study in Alameda found a correlation between concentrations of
adult establishments and secondary effects, although it did not specifically
study isolated establishments. It is logical that if the city of Erie was allowed
to “reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and

202. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). “If the Los Angeles study sheds any light whatever on
the city’s position, it is the light of skepticism, for [the Court] may fairly suspect that the study
said nothing about the secondary effects of freestanding stores because no effects were observed.”
Id.
203. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). “The Los Angeles study treats such combined stores as one
and draws no general conclusion that individual stores spread apart from other adult
establishments are associated with any degree of criminal activity above the general norm.” Id. at
462 (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 439.
205. In Pap’s A.M., the city enacted an ordinance banning public nudity. Pap’s A.M., 529
U.S. at 283. Consequently, nude dancers were required to wear, “at a minimum, pasties and a ‘Gstring.’” Id. at 284. Support for its ordinance was found in the decisions of Renton and Young,
which dealt with zoning regulations of adult motion picture theaters. See id. at 296-97.
206. Id. at 296-97.
207. Id. at 297. The plurality concluded that Erie could “reasonably rely on the evidentiary
foundation set forth in Renton and [Young] to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the
presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood.” Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. at 297.
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[Young,]”208 Los Angeles may reasonably rely on its own 1977 study. Justice
Kennedy was therefore correct in stating the city may “infer—from its study
and from its own experience—that two adult businesses under the same roof
are no better than two next door.”209 This inference is sufficient to show the
city’s zoning ordinance was designed to serve the city’s interest in avoiding the
secondary effects associated with adult businesses.
As shown, it is apparent that the plurality and concurring opinions in
Alameda are sound. The city of Los Angeles produced enough evidence at this
stage in the litigation to meet the requirements outlined in Renton. The
plurality and Justice Kennedy rightly paid substantial deference to the city’s
findings in its 1977 study of adult businesses and secondary effects. Because
the adult business did not produce evidence challenging the city’s rationale, the
city was not required to present more evidence than its study. Finally, its study
alone was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the city’s zoning
ordinance was designed to serve its interest in combating negative secondary
effects.
C. Lower Court Interpretations of Alameda
In order to assess the impact of Alameda, subsequent cases prove to be the
most insightful. A major obstacle for Alameda was that it only achieved
plurality status. One court aptly commented that the plurality status of a
decision may prove to be a disadvantage.210 Specifically, it mentioned that
“Alameda Books is difficult to apply, because no single opinion garnered the
votes of a majority of Justices.”211 This consideration is significant when
attempting to understand the lower court decisions issued after Alameda and
also provides a rationale for their apparent lack of uniformity.
1.

The Fifth Circuit Reveals Discrepancies.

Some circuit courts, including the Fifth, have used the plurality opinion in
Alameda as the appropriate authority. For example, the respondents in Baby

208. Id.
209. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “The city could reach the
reasonable conclusion that knocking down the wall between two adult businesses does not
ameliorate any undesirable secondary effects of their proximity to one another.” Id.
210. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 310 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2002). “When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 819 (quoting Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotations omitted)). Once an area of agreement has been
discovered “between ‘at least five justices,’ that conclusion is valid as law even if some of the
Justices endorsing the proposition in question were in dissent.” Id. (quoting Snead v. Redland
Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1333 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993)).
211. Id. at 818.
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Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas212 argued the zoning ordinance at
issue was not designed to serve the government’s interest in controlling
secondary effects.213 Evidence relied upon by the city in enacting its ordinance
included studies, public hearings, comment-taking, and town hall meetings
regarding the negative secondary effects produced by sexually-oriented
businesses.214 Respondents specifically claimed that the evidence produced
did not indicate that the “requirement that all dancers wear bikini tops instead
of pasties [would] reduce deleterious secondary effects.”215 The court in Baby
Dolls responded that a city was not required to demonstrate with empirical data
that its ordinance would successfully lower crime, at least “not without actual
and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the contrary.”216
The Fifth Circuit decided “it was reasonable for the [c]ity to conclude that
establishments featuring performers in attire more revealing than bikini tops
pose the same types of problems associated with other [sexual oriented
businesses.]217 This decision by the Fifth Circuit was correctly decided along
the same lines as was Alameda. Because it was reasonable for the city of Erie
in Pap’s A.M. to infer nude dancing would produce the same negative effects
as adult theaters, it was reasonable for the Fifth Circuit to conclude that
businesses allowing their performers to wear less clothing than bikini tops
would as well. Therefore, as in Alameda, the court in Baby Dolls rightly
concluded that the zoning ordinance that regulated adult businesses was
designed to serve a substantial government interest.218
Shortly after the decision in Baby Dolls was issued, the Fifth Circuit
decided Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio.219 The ordinance at issue
in Encore forbade “sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1000 feet
of residential areas.”220 As in Renton, the city in Encore relied on studies
produced by other cities that focused on secondary effects of adult businesses
in general.221 Unlike Renton however, the Fifth Circuit required the city to

212. 295 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2002).
213. Baby Dolls, 295 F.3d at 481. Respondents maintained “that the evidence the City relied
upon [was] irrelevant to the Ordinance.” Id. The ordinance imposed a locational restriction on
sexually—oriented businesses. Id. at 474. To avoid being classified as a sexually—oriented
business, dancers at the adult establishments were effectively required to wear no less than bikini
tops. See id. at 476.
214. Id. at 480.
215. Baby Dolls, 295 F.3d at 481.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 482.
218. See id. at 482.
219. 310 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2002).
220. Encore, 310 F.3d at 814. Encore Videos, a business that provided only sales for offpremises viewing, brought suit.
221. Id. at 821.
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produce more evidence than the studies, and its failure to do so prompted the
court to strike down the zoning ordinance.222
The court in Encore emphasized an apparent agreement between Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda and the dissenting opinion written
by Justice Souter.223 “Justice Kennedy and the dissenters therefore agree that
the city at least must provide evidence that the burden on speech imposed by
an ordinance is ‘no greater than necessary to further [the city’s] interest’ in
combating secondary effects.”224 The Encore court then stated that for this city
to meet its burden under Alameda, it “must provide at least some evidence of
secondary effects specific to adult businesses that sell books or videos solely
for off-site entertainment.”225
In defining the evidentiary burden held by the city, the Encore court
overlooked the holdings of both Baby Dolls and Alameda. The Court in
Alameda held that the city of Los Angeles could reasonably rely on its study to
support its zoning ordinance, at least at summary judgment stage.226 Contrary
to this position, which specified no additional support was required, the Encore
court declared that the city’s evidence was insufficient to link secondary
effects to specific adult businesses and further proof was required.227 As
shown in the above analysis, this requirement is clearly excessive, especially
because the court in Encore was also decided on a summary judgment motion.
Similarly, the conclusion in Encore directly conflicted with the prior Fifth
Circuit decision in Baby Dolls. Thus, in light of Alameda and Baby Dolls, the
Encore court reached the wrong decision and should have allowed the city to
reasonably infer from its studies that businesses exclusively selling videos for
off-premise viewing would produce the same secondary effects as other adult
businesses.
2.

The Sixth Circuit Grants Deference to a City’s Judgment.

The District Court in Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids228
dealt with a challenge to a city zoning ordinance similar to that in Young,
where an adult business could not be located within 500 feet of a residential

222. Id. at 822-23.
223. Id. at 819. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Id.
at 819 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotations omitted)).
224. Encore, 310 F.3d at 819 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425, 464 n.8 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
225. Id. at 822.
226. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. Encore, 310 F.3d at 822.
228. 227 F. Supp. 2d 731 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
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district or within 1000 feet of another adult business.229 Respondents argued
that there was no showing that the city relied upon “anything more than
speculation and unsupported conclusions” to justify its ordinance.230 Looking
to the Alameda plurality opinion, the Executive Arts court noted that a city had
“broad latitude in adopting solutions to secondary effects.”231 But, it also
specified that the city must provide evidence showing a connection between
adult businesses and secondary effects.232
Looking to the record, the court in Executive Arts found the city had
conducted meetings that discussed concerns about the “deleterious effects
caused by adult-oriented businesses” as well as various methods to alleviate
such concerns.233 It looked to the express purpose behind the ordinance234 and
also noted it was “almost identical” to the ordinance in Young.235 Relying on
the plurality in Alameda, the court in Executive Arts stated a city may rely on
evidence it reasonably believed relevant to show a connection between
secondary effects and adult businesses.236 It then appropriately concluded that
the city adequately demonstrated such a connection and could prevail on this
issue at the summary judgment stage.237
3.

The Seventh Circuit Emphasizes Effects on Speech Must be Assessed.

While conflict between the plurality and concurring opinions in Alameda
produced disputes over which rationale should be utilized, the Judicial Council
of the Seventh Circuit resolved the discrepancy solely in favor of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence. In Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset,238 the
Judicial Council noted the differences between the plurality and concurring
opinions in Alameda were quite subtle.239 Moreover, because “Justice
229. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
230. Id. at 743. “In particular, [the adult business] argue[d] that the City ha[d] failed to show
that the ordinance [was] based upon any evidence showing that there [was] a link between adult
bookstores and adverse secondary effects.” Id.
231. Id. at 742.
232. Id. at 742 (requiring the city to show a connection is not a demanding standard,
however).
233. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
234. The purpose of this ordinance was “to address secondary effects caused by
concentrations of specific businesses, particularly those engaged in the sale or display of
sexually-explicit material.” Id. at 744.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 742.
237. Id. at 744.
238. 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003).
239. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 721. “[W]hile Justice Kennedy believed that the plurality did not
adequately address” the effect the city’s regulation would have on speech, “he agreed with the
plurality’s overall conclusion that a municipality’s initial burden of demonstrating a substantial
government interest in regulating the adverse secondary effects associated with adult
entertainment [was] slight.” Id. at 721-22.
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Kennedy’s concurrence [was] the narrowest opinion joining the judgment of
the Court in Alameda,” it should be considered the “controlling opinion.”240
The ordinance at issue in Ben’s Bar prohibited the sale and consumption of
alcohol on the premises of adult businesses.241 The Village Board, in enacting
the ordinance, used judicial decisions, multiple studies from other cities, and
reports to “support its conclusion that adult entertainment produce[d] adverse
secondary effects.”242 Respondents in Ben’s Bar argued the city must conduct
its own studies “to determine whether adverse secondary effects result when
liquor is served on the premises of adult entertainment establishments.”243
Citing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alameda, the Judicial Council quickly
disposed of the claim, stating the respondent’s view had “been expressly (and
repeatedly) rejected by the Supreme Court.”244
The respondents in Ben’s Bar next contended that the city’s reports were
faulty because they failed to relate specifically to the “effects of serving
alcohol in establishments offering nude and semi-nude dancing.”245 Relying
on the plurality opinion in Alameda, the Judicial Council for the Seventh
Circuit found “it was entirely reasonable for the Village to conclude that
barroom nude dancing was likely to produce adverse secondary effects at the
local level, even in the absence of specific studies on the matter.”246 Based on
the preceding analysis of Alameda, it is apparent the Judicial Council correctly
resolved Ben’s Bar in holding the evidentiary record, without more, fairly
supported the city’s secondary effects rationale.247
4.

The Eighth Circuit Proves the City’s Rationale is Sufficient.

As in Alameda, the issue before the Eighth Circuit in SOB, Inc. v. County
of Benton was whether there was “sufficient evidence of adverse secondary

240. Id. at 722.
241. Id. at 723.
242. Id. at 725.
243. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 725.
244. Id. To support this proposition, the Ben’s Bar court relies on the language from Renton
that “the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting an ordinance to conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the
city addresses.” Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986);
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 451-52 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 726. The Judicial Council further stressed that “the Supreme Court has gone so far
as to assert that ‘[c]ommon sense indicates that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in a
public place begets undesirable behavior.’” Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 726 (quoting New York State
Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)).
247. Id.
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effects to justify” the enactment of the county’s nude dancing regulation.248
An adult business, featuring nude dancing, challenged the county’s ordinance,
which effectively compelled the business’ dancers to wear pasties and Gstrings when performing.249 Before the ordinance was passed, the county
gathered studies from other cities addressing the secondary effects associated
with adult businesses and held a public hearing in which citizens showed their
support for the ordinance.250 The adult business argued the evidence was
insufficient to show the ordinance furthered the county’s interest in combating
secondary effects because of contrary evidence that had been produced.251
Although the SOB court relied on Alameda, the ordinance before it was a
ban on nude dancing, and as such, the evidence required to support it was
different than that necessary for the zoning regulation at issue in Alameda.252
Notwithstanding this difference, the SOB court garnered support from Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda to conclude “a ban on live nude
dancing impose[d] a de minimis restriction on expressive conduct, while
otherwise ‘leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially
intact.’”253 Granting deference to the county’s studies,254 the SOB court
concluded that because the adult business “failed to cast sufficient doubt on the
County’s rationale for the Ordinance, the ban on live nude dancing [was]
constitutional.”255
If SOB had dealt with a zoning ordinance, the Eighth Circuit might not
have reached the same result. Given its reliance on both the plurality and

248. 317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003).
249. SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 859.
250. Id. at 862-63.
251. Id. at 863. The evidence showed that the adult business “had neither caused higher
crime rates nor depressed the value of nearby properties in the time [it] had been operating.” Id.
Additionally, the adult business “submitted an article criticizing the methodologies of the
secondary effects studies relied upon by other municipalities.” Id. (citing Bryant Paul, et al.,
Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances:
Dubunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL. 355 (2001)).
252. Id. at 863. The adult business brought forth evidence that “addressed only two adverse
secondary effects, property values and crime in the vicinity of an adult entertainment
establishment.” SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863. Although these effects may be especially relevant to
zoning regulations, a “ban on live nude dancing may address other adverse secondary effects,
such as the likelihood that an [establishment’s] dancers and customers . . . will foster illegal
activity such as drug use, prostitution, tax evasion, and fraud.” Id.
253. Id. at 863 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425, 449
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
254. Id. at 863-64. In reaching this conclusion, the court in SOB heavily relied on the
plurality opinion from Pap’s A.M., which stated the city was not required to produce independent
evidence as long as it reasonably believed it to be relevant. Id. at 863 (citing City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000)). The SOB court also looked to both Alameda’s plurality opinion
and concurrence to support its deferential outcome. SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863-64.
255. Id. at 864.
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concurring opinions in Alameda256 and the presence of conflicting evidence
relevant to the rationale behind a zoning ordinance,257 the county most likely
would have had to produce additional evidence.258 As shown in the Alameda
analysis however, because there was no conflicting evidence with respect to
the rationale of the county’s nude dancing ban, the Eighth Circuit correctly
decided that the county’s findings addressing secondary effects was sufficient.
5.

The Ninth Circuit Reaffirms the Reasonable Reliance Test.

In the Ninth Circuit case, Deja Vu-Everett-Federal Way, Inc. v. City of
Federal Way,259 the city amended its zoning ordinance that regulated adult
businesses.260 The respondent argued that the city “had not shown that the
then-existing zoning regulations had proven ineffective at curbing secondary
effects of adult uses,”261 and “should be required to conduct its own study to
show why the existing regulations need[ed] to be modified.”262 Responding to
this argument, the Deja Vu court looked to Alameda.263 The Ninth Circuit
quickly disposed of the respondent’s claim after finding that the “regulations
were based on the studies, experiences, and police records of many cities.”264
Therefore, the evidence relied upon by the city was reasonably relevant to the
problem the city addressed265 and satisfied the standards outlined by
Alameda’s plurality.266

256. See id. at 863-64.
257. The evidence produced by the adult business “addressed only two adverse secondary
effects, property values and crime in the vicinity of an adult entertainment establishment. These
are issues particularly relevant to zoning.” Id. at 863.
258. “If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a municipality’s rationale” by “furnishing
evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual findings,” the municipality would be left with
the additional burden of “supplement[ing] the record with evidence renewing support for a theory
that justifies its ordinance.” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439 (plurality opinion).
259. 46 Fed.Appx. 409 (9th Cir. 2002).
260. Deja Vu, 46 Fed.Appx. at 410. In effect, the zoning ordinance would require the adult
business to “shut down, change, or move its operation.” Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 410-11. “The City of Los Angeles was allowed to modify existing regulations by
relying on the same study on which the city relied when enacting the original regulations.” Deja
Vu, 46 Fed.Appx. at 410-11.
264. Id. at 411.
265. Id.
266. “A municipality may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ for
demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)). It was reasonable for the city of Federal
Way to rely on studies produced by other cities because Renton held a city was not required to
conduct its own studies or produce independent evidence. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.
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The respondent in Deja Vu further argued that the city failed to pass the
test Justice Kennedy developed in his Alameda concurrence. Under this
alleged test, the city must advance “some basis to show that its regulation ha[d]
the purpose of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and
accessibility of speech substantially intact.”267 The Deja Vu court also quickly
rejected this argument by stating the city had “satisfied Justice Kennedy’s
‘test,’ as well as that of the plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor.”268
Although the Ninth Circuit seemed to endorse two different evidentiary
standards for zoning ordinances, its reasoning is sound. The evidence
presented in this case was composed of studies, experiences, and police reports
while the evidence offered in Alameda was the city’s own study. The holding
in Alameda was achieved with the help of Justice Kennedy, who concluded it
was reasonable for the city of Los Angeles to rely on its study to show a
connection between adult businesses and secondary effects.269 Accordingly, it
was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit in Deja Vu to conclude the city could
reasonably rely on the evidence it already produced and was not required to
produce additional evidence.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As shown, courts must balance competing interests when asked to rule on
the validity of a city’s zoning ordinance regulating adult entertainment
businesses. The circuit court opinions before Alameda, although relying on
Supreme Court precedent, displayed confusion about the evidentiary
requirement that must be satisfied for a city to prove that its ordinance was
designed to serve a substantial government interest. Both the plurality opinion
in Alameda and that of Justice Kennedy provided appropriate instruction for
the lower courts to follow when presented with similar regulations.
Consequently, the decisions issued after Alameda reveal a general acceptance
of both rationales. Therefore, a combination of rationales taken from both the
plurality and concurring opinions, which provide standards for judging
whether a city’s zoning ordinance was designed to serve its interests, should be
followed.
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267. Deja Vu, 46 Fed.Appx. at 411.
268. Id.
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